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Abstract 
This study responds to the need for more empirical knowledge pertaining to the effect of religion on 
development efforts. We find that Christian Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have significantly lower 
funding costs and consistently underperform in terms of financial profit indicators. Contrary to our 
hypotheses Christian MFIs are as efficient in assuring loan repayment and their average loan sizes are on 
par with those of their secular peers. When splitting the Christian MFIs into Catholic and Protestant 
subgroups, we find that the lower financial performance for Catholic MFIs seems to be driven by the 
lower interest rates that are charged on outstanding loan portfolios whereas the lower financial 
performance of Protestant MFIs is a result of higher operating costs.  In addition, the study provides a 
new agenda for research pertaining to the effects of religion on development efforts.  
 




The effects of religion on development efforts: Evidence from the microfinance 
industry and a research agenda 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite repeated claims that religions and religious beliefs represent an important yet neglected factor 
in development (e.g., Marshall & Keough, 2004; Ter Haar and Ellis, 2006; Thomas, 2005), empirical 
studies on the effects of religion on development efforts are scarce. Religion may influence the 
perceptions and behaviors of several parties in the development arena. Regarding the recipients of 
development efforts, Ter Haar and Ellis (2006) claim that religious beliefs provide moral guidance and 
encourage people to improve their lives. Religion may also influence providers of development efforts. 
For example, many international development organizations, such as World Vision and Catholic Relief 
Services, are Christian organizations. The microfinance industry is no exception. Several Christian 
organizations, such as Opportunity International and Vision Fund, are actively involved in advancing the 
microfinance industry. In this paper, we use microfinance institutions (MFIs) as examples of providers of 
development efforts and determine the differences between Christian and secular MFIs in various 
dimensions of organizational performance.1 
MFIs provide poor families and micro-entrepreneurs with banking services, such as loans and saving 
facilities. The development-enhancing aspect of microfinance has been recognized by the United 
Nations, which declared 2005 the Year of Microcredit, and by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which 
awarded the Peace Prize to microfinance pioneer Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 
2006. Because Islamic law strictly bans the practice of charging predetermined interest rates on loans or 
savings, researchers have long been interested in Islamic finance in general and Islamic microfinance in 
particular (Karim, Tarazi, & Reille, 2008; Kaleem & Ahmed, 2010). However, we are not familiar with any 
rigorous empirical studies of Christian microfinance. 
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Although many Western policy elites hold a secular worldview and equate modernization and 
secularization (Thomas, 2005), many aid and development organizations are based on religious principles 
and are managed by people who are inspired by religious beliefs. More important, in a purely secular 
model, the basic values of large groups of poor people are ignored. Increasingly, several parties in the 
development arena seem to share this concern. A few years ago, the UK government initiated a project 
known as Faith in Development, a multimillion-pound research consortium. Similarly, the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs instituted the Knowledge Forum on Religion and Development Policy, and the 
Norwegian government recently launched a dialog initiative about religion and aid. The World Bank has 
delivered several reports on religion and development issues (e.g., Marshall & Keough, 2004). Clearly, 
there is no lack of policy interest concerning religion and development; however, empirical research 
regarding the influence of religion on development is fragmented and still in its infancy.  
Donor governments have often been reluctant to channel much public support through faith-based 
organizations because they fear using public funds for religious purposes. However, since the launch of 
former President George W. Bush’s initiative to fund the social initiatives of faith-based organizations, 
there has been a sharp increase in public funding for both national and international efforts (Formicola, 
Segers, & Weber, 2003; Harper, Rao, & Sahu, 2008). The claim is that faith-based organizations can 
produce important social outcomes (Johnson, 2002).  
In addition to being involved in development efforts, faith-based organizations are common in other 
industries, especially health care, retirement or nursing homes and education. However, whether and 
how religious affiliation affects operations and organizational performance in these industries remain 
unclear (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2009).  
In the economic history literature, there is a long-standing debate regarding the role of religion in 
stimulating economic growth. This debate began with Max Weber’s classic work The Protestant Ethic and 
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the Spirit of Capitalism (1930/1958). Weber claimed that the Protestant ethic, which focuses on personal 
agency and diligence, spurred economic development. Although Weber’s thesis has been disputed, the 
more general idea that certain religious (Christian) attitudes may have positive economic implications 
continues to be discussed and supported (e.g., Iannaccone, 1998). The extensive debate regarding the 
historical role of religion in the development of modern capitalism sharply contrasts with the meager 
attention that has been devoted to religion in current development efforts and research.  
There are reasons to expect Christian development organizations to differ from their secular 
counterparts. According to institutional theory, three major forces cause organizations in a field to be 
more isomorphic, or similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). First, important actors on whom organizations 
depend, such as governments or other parties with resources, may impose regulations or policies that 
lead to isomorphism. However, the microfinance industry is weakly regulated or unregulated in most 
countries. Second, organizations may mimic popular practices in other organizations, particularly in 
uncertain conditions. Thus, if MFIs prefer to mimic peers with whom they share the same ideology and 
faith, it may be argued that Christian MFIs will be more similar. Third, according to DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), isomorphism becomes normatively ordained when credentialing institutions or professional 
networks establish the conditions of membership and work methods. As for the microfinance industry, 
there are several standardization initiatives, such as the CGAP policy recommendations, the SMART 
campaign, the SEEP initiatives, the rating bureaus, and the Microcredit Summit. Therefore, in the future, 
MFIs may become more similar. However, for now, we still believe that there is considerable freedom for 
each MFI to define its policies and practices according to its own ideology and objectives. Moreover, 
isomorphism within the group of Christian MFIs can be expected because they often belong to the same 
professional networks, such as Opportunity International and Vision Fund. 
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In sum, the forces that typically cause organizations in a field to become similar are still not very strong 
in the international microfinance industry. In addition, Christian and secular MFIs are partly influenced 
by different isomorphic factors because they normally have different owners, often have different 
donors or funders and depend on public funding to different degrees (secular MFIs typically are more 
dependent on public funding). Therefore, we expect substantial differences in the practices and 
potentially in the performances of Christian and secular MFIs. 
Preliminary evidence for this position is found in a study by Harper et al. (2008). In investigating a sample 
of 11 secular and 11 Christian international development organizations in the UK and the US, Harper et 
al. (2008) report that secular NGOs in both the UK and the US receive a higher portion of their budgets 
from public donors. Additionally, salaries for managers were higher in secular NGOs. No differences were 
found for fund-raising costs and average staff costs. However, more general studies are lacking, and the 
role and influence of religious organizational identity remain largely unexplored.  
In this study, we compare the performance of Christian-initiated MFIs with secular MFIs in terms of 
several financial performance indicators and some proxies for social outcomes. To this end, we develop 
hypotheses that explore performance differences between Christian MFIs and secular MFIs. We find that 
Christian MFIs have significantly lower funding costs and consistently underperform in terms of financial 
profit indicators. Contrary to our hypotheses Christian MFIs are as efficient in assuring loan repayment 
and their average loan sizes are on par with those of their secular peers. When splitting the Christian 
MFIs into Catholic and Protestant subgroups, we find that the lower financial performance for Catholic 
MFIs seems to be driven by the lower interest rates that are charged on outstanding loan portfolios 
whereas the lower financial performance of Protestant MFIs is a result of higher operating costs.   
In the following sections, we describe the microfinance industry and the involvement of Christian actors. 
Next, we develop hypotheses regarding the ways in which Christian MFIs may perform differently from 
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secular MFIs. We describe the methods for the empirical comparisons, report the results of the analyses 
and provide some additional information with which to compare performance differences between 
Protestant and Catholic MFIs. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings and suggest an agenda 
for future research regarding the role of religion in development. 
 
2. Microfinance and Christian actors  
The microfinance industry is vibrant. More than 3,000 actors provide their data to the Microcredit 
Summit, and these actors report serving more than 150 million credit clients (Daley-Harris, 2009). The 
diversity of ownership in the industry is substantial. Member-based cooperatives, foundations, 
government banks, private persons, shareholder entities, listed commercial banks and even multibillion 
dollar international banks constitute a colorful and rapidly growing industry. The objectives of such 
organizations range from female empowerment to high profit. Among these organizations, several 
religion-based actors are involved, including Hindu, Islamic and especially Christian organizations (Harper 
et al., 2008).  
The often low financial sustainability, combined with the high interest rates on microfinance loans (our 
sample has an average portfolio yield of 39%), indicates a need to address cost structures in the industry 
(Rosenberg, Gonzalez, & Narain, 2009). Likewise, in a recent paper, Mersland and Strøm (2010) illustrate 
the importance of cost reductions in increasing the penetration of services to the poor populations. In 
this regard, it is important to identify efficiency drivers in the industry. Mersland (2009) theorizes that an 
MFI’s ownership type may influence its performance, but Mersland and Strøm (2008) cannot confirm 
performance differences between MFIs incorporated as shareholder companies and MFIs categorized as 
non-governmental organizations. However, whether the origins of religious organizations affect their 
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performance has thus far not been studied. As illustrated by Knox, Blankmeyer, and Stutzman (2006) in a 
study on the nursing industry in Texas, it is important to explore beyond the legal type of ownership to 
better understand how religious affiliation per se may influence organizational efficiency. 
In fact, many MFIs have Christian origins. For example, the international network of Opportunity 
International currently includes 43 MFIs in 26 countries, and the Vision Fund of World Vision operates 42 
MFIs in 42 countries. Other important international Christian microfinance actors include Catholic Relief 
Services, Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA), the Norwegian Mission Alliance, World 
Relief, Cordaid, ICCO, Oikocredit and the Stromme Foundation. Although Mohammad Yunus is 
celebrated for conceiving modern microfinance in the Bangladeshi village of Jobra in 1976, several years 
beforehand, David Bussau and Al Whittaker, motivated by their Christian faith, started issuing small 
loans to generate jobs. Their initiative later became known as Opportunity International. Similarly, MEDA 
in Paraguay preceded Mr. Yunus.  
In a historical perspective it should not be surprising that Christian organizations are actively involved in 
traditional aid and development efforts and in enterprising and banking initiatives. For example, in 
Europe, Protestant pastors and Christian businesspeople were at the forefront in the savings bank 
movement that spread throughout the Europe 150 to 200 years ago (Horne, 1947). In the UK, the 
Anglican Reverend Henry Duncan became known as the “father of savings banks.” Likewise, Catholic 
priests were and continue to be important figures in many savings and credit cooperatives, which 
represent a microfinance movement that has persisted for more than 150 years (Teck, 1968).  
Thus far, the existence and effect of religious actors in modern microfinance has not been addressed by 
rigorous research. Bussau and Mask (2003) outline the theological reasons why Christian actors should 
care about microfinance and entrepreneurship, and Harper et al. (2008) relate the stories of three 
8 
 
religious MFIs: one Muslim, one Christian and one Hindu. To the best of our knowledge, other, more 
academic sources are not available.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop hypotheses regarding performance differences between Christian MFIs and 
secular MFIs. MFIs pursue two bottom lines, outreach to poor customers and financial returns (Morduch, 
1999), but there is a trade-off between these two objectives (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2010). We therefore explore the effect of religion on both social outcomes and 
financial performance.  
3.1. Social performance 
Although most microfinance actors agree that both financial and social objectives are important, there is 
no consensus as to how social performance should be measured (Hashemi, 2007). Academic researchers 
are therefore struggling to identify the appropriate variables to represent social performance. The 
average loan size and the targeting of female clients are the most widely used social outreach indicators 
in microfinance research (Cull et al. 2007, Mersland & Strøm, 2010) and are the variables used in this 
paper to represent social performance.  
Outreach to poor clients 
Concern for the poor is a central biblical virtue. In fact, working is partly motivated by the opportunity to 
assist those in need: “Let the thief no longer steal, but rather let him labor, doing honest work with his 
hands, so that he may be able to give to those in need” (Ephesians 4.28). Serving the poor is a major 
concern in the teachings of Jesus. For instance, in his response to the young man who claims to have 
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lived a good life within the norms and rules of The Law, Jesus replies as follows (Matthew 19.21): "If you 
would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; 
and come, follow me."  
In line with the biblical imperative to serve the poor, Bussau and Mask argue that Christian MFIs should 
be at the forefront of servicing the poorest customers (Bussau & Mask, 2003). Average loan size is the 
most widely used indicator to indicate whether an MFI reaches poor customers. For MFIs offering some 
big loans alongside many small loans, their average outstanding loan balances do not fully reflect their 
social profiles, and the average loan does not necessarily reflect the clients’ poverty level. Nevertheless, 
the average outstanding loan balance is constantly tracked by MFI boards, investors and other 
stakeholders because it gives a rough measure of the MFI’s poverty focus. We expect the following 
hypothesis to hold: 
Hypothesis 1 a): Christian MFIs have lower average loan balances compared with secular MFIs. 
 
Targeting female clients 
Microfinance and women have always been intrinsically linked. Since the experimental schemes in Asia 
and Latin America in the 1970s, microfinance has primarily targeted women (Aghion & Morduch, 2005). 
Women are more likely than men to repay their loans (D'Espallier, Guerin, & Mersland, 2011). In 
addition, by enabling women to develop or strengthen income-generating activities, microfinance is 
likely to increase their monetary income, their control over their income and their bargaining power 
within the household. Among some Christian believers, especially in developing countries, such female 
empowerment can be contrary to Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, because several studies confirm that 
a dollar loaned to a woman has a greater development effect than a dollar loaned to a man (World-Bank, 
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2007) and because women tend to be poorer than men, we expect that the poverty orientation of 
Christian MFIs should incline them to focus on women.  
As with the average loan, the percentage of female clients is a proxy for social performance that is in 
dispute. Overreliance on serving women may actually cause harm to women. For example, women may 
be taking out loans for their husbands, or they may end up being in charge of the families’ monetary 
income, adding one more duty to a list that is often already unbalanced because of their sex. However, 
because servicing loans for women has been and continues to be at the forefront of the microfinance 
industry (see, for example, www.microcreditsummit.org), it is relevant to test whether religious 
affiliation affects the MFI’s outreach to women. The following hypothesis is thus proposed: 
Hypothesis 1 b): Christian MFIs have relatively more female clients compared with secular MFIs. 
 
3.2. Financial performance 
Four underlying variables constitute the majority of an MFI’s financial profits: operational income, 
financial costs, operational costs, and loan losses. To better understand the financial performance 
differences between Christian and secular MFIs, we develop hypotheses for each variable.  
Maximizing operational income  
Operational income consists of the loan portfolio multiplied by the effective interest rate. Most MFIs still 
operate in markets in which they have some oligopoly power and can decide their price levels to a 
certain extent. In some markets, such as Ecuador, there are interest rate caps established by the 
government, but within those caps, MFIs determine the prices of their services. Harper et al. (2008) 
argue that the practice of charging sustainable interest rates represents a stark dilemma for Christian 
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MFIs and that it is the antithesis of the long-term charity inherent in faith-based organizations. World 
Relief (1996) and Burbank (undated) indicate that Christian MFIs ethically can charge interest rates, but 
not at usury levels. Thus, we would expect Christian MFIs to be more inclined to “help” their clients by 
offering interest rates that are lower than those offered by secular MFIs. We use an MFI’s portfolio yield 
to represent an MFI’s interest rate and hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 a): Christian MFIs have a lower portfolio yield compared with secular MFIs. 
Minimizing financial costs 
A main difference between microfinance and regular banking is that finance costs are relatively less 
important than operational costs in microfinance. This difference occurs because operational costs are 
high and subsidized funding is available. Nevertheless, the median cost of borrowed funds in our data set 
is approximately 7%, and liability management is becoming more important in the industry. The 
likelihood of a Christian MFI hiring management with the “right” theology but not necessarily the best 
management skills may have a negative influence on the financial costs of MFIs. However, the 
microfinance industry is international in scope (Mersland, Randøy & Strøm, 2011), and international 
lenders invest approximately US $10 billion into MFIs (Reille, Glisovic-Mezieres, & Berthouzoz, 2009). 
Several international lenders, including one of the world’s largest, Oikocredit, have a Christian identity. 
Moreover, several international microfinance networks and other types of support organizations are 
Christian and provide financial support to MFIs. Although most of the international Christian lenders and 
support organizations do not explicitly favor Christian MFIs, we would still expect that better access to 
international networks and lenders and sharing a common faith would result in lower financial costs for 
Christian MFIs. We thus propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 b): Christian MFIs have relatively lower financial costs compared with secular MFIs. 
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Minimizing operational costs 
In our data set, the median operational cost relative to the loan portfolio is 23%, compared with the 
median finance cost of 7%. The small loans and related frequent, small transaction values in 
microfinance represent a major driver of high cost levels, but it is important for the industry to identify 
cost drivers to improve future efficiency levels in the industry (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). From a 
theoretical standpoint, operational efficiency is probably the most interesting variable in an analysis of 
the economic influence of religion. This topic also has the most developed academic literature pertaining 
to the economic influence of religion. The strongest empirical cases showing a positive efficiency 
influence of religion have been offered in psychological research (mostly American and Western 
European) regarding the effects of Christian belief on individual behavior and social outcomes. 
McCullough and Willoughby (2009) present a comprehensive and critical review of this literature. They 
conclude that some types of religious beliefs, behavior, and cognition foster self-regulation and self-
control, which in turn have positive implications in terms of stronger task diligence and persistence and a 
better capacity to change behavior according to the feelings and wishes of other people. In a principal-
agent model, self-control should reduce agency costs and have a positive effect on organizational 
efficiency.   
In addition to self-control and self-regulation effects, religion may stimulate work motivation by 
sanctifying work goals (Emmons, 1999). A series of studies shows that when people think of their work as 
a divine calling, they find their work more rewarding and spend more time on work (Wrzesniewski, 
McCauley, Rozin, & Schwarz, 1997), they are more committed to work goals, and they are among the 
strongest believers in success at work (Emmons, Cheung, &Therani, 1998; Mahoney et al., 2005).  
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Based on the assumption that Christian MFIs tend to hire staff and management with Christian beliefs, as 
argued by Bussau and Mask (2003), the literature review above indicates that Christian MFIs should be 
more operationally efficient compared with secular MFIs. 
Although psychological research suggests that there could be positive economic implications of Christian 
beliefs, there are also reasons to expect the opposite. First, religious leaders and workers in MFIs may 
pursue work goals that are partly opposed to the goals of operational efficiency. Research indicates that 
when work goals are sanctified, the result is stronger commitment, persistence, and perceptions of self-
efficacy (McCullough &Willoughby, 2009). However, if individual goals are not related to organizational 
performance, the bottom-line effect of sanctified goals could even be negative. For instance, religious 
leaders and employees may develop goals that relate to workplace climate, cooperation, and ethics 
rather than organizational efficiency goals. When individual non-performance goals are dominant, 
religious MFIs may develop cultures that are inefficient and uncompetitive. As evidence, Wooten, Coker, 
and Elmore (2003) observed that religious NGOs were too focused on their religious missions at the 
expense of financial control. Likewise, some authors argue that Christian MFIs should have a triple 
bottom line—financial results, social results and spiritual results—and that, for example, high client/staff 
efficiency ratios are incompatible with the achievement of spiritual results (Bussau & Mask, 2003).   
A similar type of goal bias could be observed with the boards of religious organizations. Board members 
who represent religious organizations may focus primarily on the theological profiles of the organizations 
and the spiritual leadership of leader candidates. Thus, the leaders of such organizations may have the 
“right theology” but may have subpar management skills. Thus, we present two rival hypotheses 
regarding the relative efficiency of Christian MFIs:  
Hypothesis 2 c-I): Christian MFIs have higher operational efficiency levels compared with secular MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 2 c-II): Christian MFIs have lower operational efficiency levels compared with secular MFIs. 
Minimizing loan losses 
Modern microfinance was intended as a response to the high default rates in subsidized rural credit from 
the 1950s to the 1980s (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). Thus, the low default rates in microfinance are one of 
the industry’s main achievements. However, not all MFIs report low default rates. In our data set, the 
default rates, which are measured as the proportion of a portfolio that is more than 30 days in arrears 
(PaR30), range from 0 to 97%. Therefore, not all MFIs enjoy low default rates, and this variance probably 
indicates that keeping defaults down is to a large extent a managerial issue. Harper et al. (2008) indicate 
that financial sustainability is the antithesis of forgiveness, a classic Christian virtue. Christian MFIs 
should thus be more inclined to “help” their clients and be more lenient in enforcing loan repayment. 
Likewise, the effect of sanctified workplace goals as outlined above, such as organizational climates and 
ethics, may also have a negative influence on loan loss efficiency. Furthermore, Christian MFIs may not 
be willing to practice heavy-handed enforcement methods that they consider unethical. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2 d): Christian MFIs have lower loan loss efficiency compared with secular MFIs. 
Bottom-line financial performance 
As outlined above, the influence of having a Christian origin may have different effects on the four 
underlying drivers of the MFI’s bottom-line financial profits. We thus present two rival hypotheses 
regarding bottom-line financial performance: 
Hypothesis 2 e-I): Christian MFIs have better bottom-line performance compared with secular MFIs. 




4. Data and methodology 
Data pertaining to 405 MFIs operating in 73 countries worldwide have been extracted from detailed 
assessment reports gathered by specialized rating agencies that are supported by CGAP’s Rating Fund 
(www.ratingfund2.org). Ratings were performed from 2001 to 2010, and for each rating, an average of 
four years of data were obtained2. For this study, the source of information is vitally important because 
the reports contain detailed information regarding the background of the MFIs and allow us to identify 
whether an MFI has a Christian origin.3 In Table 1, we provide a detailed description of and summary 
statistics for the main variables used throughout this study. This table should provide a clear overview of 
the sample that is investigated.  
As shown in the table, the median MFI in our sample has 2.67 million U.S. dollars in total assets and 
operates a total loan portfolio of 1.97 million dollars. The median MFI is eight years old and has an 
outstanding loan balance per client of 386 US dollars; these figures indicate the newness of the industry 
and the micro aspect of microfinance. Nearly three-quarters of the clients in the median MFI are women, 
demonstrating the strong female focus in the industry. Twenty-eight percent of the MFIs are regulated 
by banking authorities; a third of the MFIs are incorporated as banks or non-bank financial institutions; 
and, most important for this study, one in six MFIs (17%) have Christian origins. Overall, financial 
performance is not particularly high, with a median ROA of 2.5%, operational self-sufficiency (OSS) of 
1.11 and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) of 0.96.4 The FSS figure suggests that a substantial number of 
MFIs struggle to gain financial independence and continue to rely on donors and subsidies. The drivers of 
the bottom-line profit indicate that the median yield is 34%, the cost of borrowed funds is 7%, the 
operational costs are 23% and the portfolios at risk are 3%.  
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The representativeness of the sample is always an important issue. Although the rating data are 
considered among the most representative data that are available for studying the microfinance 
industry, no data set is perfectly representative of the microfinance field. For instance, our set contains 
relatively few of the largest MFIs and does not cover the virtually infinite number of small savings and 
credit cooperatives active in the industry. The former category is rated by agencies that include Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s whereas the latter category is not rated at all. Overall, we believe that our 
database provides a more representative image of the microfinance industry compared with other 
available data sets, such as Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org), which has a well-known large firm bias. 
   
Table 1 around here 
 
We first examine univariate t-tests that analyze the differences between the two groups in the different 
hypothesized performance variables. Next, we regress the different performance indicators on a set of 
control variables (firm-specific and contextual controls) and the dummy for Christian compared with 
secular MFIs using a random-effects (RE) model. RE models have several important benefits that have 
increased their popularity in earlier performance studies. First, RE models account for all unobserved, 
institution-specific variation by including a term μi that reduces any bias from potentially omitted 
variables. Second, RE models are better suited to handle the time-invariant nature of some of the 
covariates than, for instance, fixed-effects (FE) models, which eliminate time-invariant variables by first-
differencing.   
In the regressions, we include a set of MFI-specific controls that have been used in earlier performance 
studies to relate the variables of size and age, the dummy for regulation and the dummy for ownership. 
In addition, we employ a set of country-specific controls that account for the possibility that 
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performance may be tied to the specific economic context in which an MFI is active. Finally, we include 
both time and regional dummies to account for time-specific and regional differences in overall 
macroeconomic conditions that may affect performance. The standard errors used for computing 
significance levels are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In addition, standard errors 
are clustered at the MFI level to account for MFI-level heterogeneity.      
 
5. Analysis and results 
Table 2 compares the performance of Christian and secular MFIs using univariate t-statistics (mean 
values) and χ²-statistics (median values). As shown in the table, Christian and secular MFIs differ on 
several variables. In line with our hypotheses, Christian MFIs have a significantly lower portfolio yield and 
a lower cost of funds compared with their secular counterparts. The operational costs and portfolios at 
risk are identical for the two types of MFIs. The lower funding costs do not balance the lower portfolio 
yield; thus, the bottom-line financial performance of Christian MFIs is lower (measured with ROA and 
FSS) than that of secular MFIs. The clear difference between OSS and FSS values indicates that Christian 
MFIs are more dependent on support from donors. Contrary to our hypothesis, Christian MFIs serve 
relatively fewer female clients, whereas the average loan size in Christian MFIs does not significantly 
differ from that of secular MFIs.   
Table 2 around here 
 
We now turn to multivariate statistics and begin with Table 3, in which social performance differences 
are measured using the average loan size and the percentage of female clients as proxies for social 
performance. As shown in the table, the findings from the univariate statistics are upheld. Christian MFIs 
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serve significantly fewer female clients whereas the average loan size is not significantly different, 
although the sign is negative. These findings, especially the finding related to female clients, should be 
interpreted with caution. After all, nearly two-thirds of the clients are women in Christian MFIs. 
Considering the risk of feminizing families’ debts, it might well be that the share of female clients in 
Christian MFIs are on healthier levels than in secular MFIs.  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
In Table 4, we report the RE-performance regressions, in which the different financial performance 
drivers (portfolio yield, cost of funds, operational costs, and portfolios at risk) are regressed against the 
Christian versus secular dummy and a set of MFI-specific and country-specific controls. As shown in this 
table, the R² and the Wald statistics yield satisfactory results. Like the results for the social performance 
regressions, the results from the univariate statistics are also upheld for the RE-performance regressions. 
Christian MFIs charge lower interest rates (proxied with portfolio yield) and have a lower cost of funds 
compared with secular MFIs. No significant differences can be found for operational costs or portfolios at 
risk; therefore, on average, Christian MFIs are equal to secular MFIs in terms of operational efficiency 
and in ensuring that their clients repay their loans.  
With the firm-specific control variables, we observe that older and regulated MFIs reduce their interest 
rates whereas for-profit MFIs charge higher rates on their loans. The control variables yield few other 
interesting results, except that larger MFIs are associated with lower funding costs, and older MFIs have 
more portfolios at risk. This latter result probably is due to the greater knowledge of experienced MFIs 
regarding how to handle higher levels of defaults. The Human Development Index indicates that interest 
rates, operational costs and funding costs are higher in more developed countries. The higher funding 
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costs may result from the greater difficulty of MFIs operating in more developed countries in obtaining 
subsidized international funding. It is not surprising that the other country variables are not significant 
because most of the heterogeneity due to country-level differences is already eliminated by the regional 
dummies and the random effects. Additionally, the conversion of all monetary variables into US dollars 
further reduces country heterogeneity. 
   
Table 4 around here 
 
How does the Christian influence on performance drivers influence the bottom-line financial 
performance of MFIs? Table 5 reports results for ROA, OSS and FSS. As indicated in the table, Christian 
MFIs show significantly lower bottom-line financial performance compared with secular MFIs, regardless 
of which bottom-line performance variable is considered. The lower cost of funds reported in Table 4 
does not balance the lower portfolio yield. In unreported analyses, we have also calculated the 
percentage of MFIs that break even, and we find that although 81.5% of the secular MFIs break even, 
only 72% of the Christian MFIs have a positive bottom line.  
Table 5 around here  
6. Additional analyses 
Kock, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2009) report that the aid provided by international NGOs is 
clustered and that countries of operation are selected on the basis of common religious traits between 
the donor and recipient organizations. If this observation is accurate, then Christian MFIs are probably 
concentrated in specific countries and regions, and this concentration may influence the results reported 
above. To control for this influence, we have rerun the regressions (unreported) on a sub-sample that 
includes only those secular MFIs that operate in countries where Christian MFIs are represented. The 
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results, both in terms of signs and relative effects, are largely similar to the results presented in Tables 3, 
4 and 5, indicating that our results are robust.  
The Christian church is divided into several branches or denominations. The two largest branches in 
terms of membership are the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant churches. According to the German 
social scientist Max Weber, in the nineteenth century, a business philosophy emerged within 
Protestantism that promoted the rise of modern capitalism. Whereas Catholicism encouraged respect 
for traditions and authority, Protestant doctrines focused on individual responsibility, diligence and 
personal agency. Several aspects of Weber’s historical analyses are debated, but leading historians seem 
to support the notion that Protestantism produced a moral character conducive to economic 
performance. For instance, in a comment referring to the Weber thesis, Harvard’s David Landes (1998, p. 
177) concludes as follows:  
The heart of the matter lay indeed in the making of a new kind of man – rational, ordered, 
diligent, productive. These virtues, while not new, were hardly commonplace. Protestantism 
generalized them among its adherents, who judged one another by conforming to these 
standards.  
The question is whether such personal characteristics continue to be more prevalent among Protestants 
200 years after the Industrial Revolution. A recent cross-national study of the social and institutional 
determinants of entrepreneurial activity suggests that some differences continue to exist. The authors 
observe a negative effect of hierarchical religions (e.g., Roman Catholic and Islam) compared with non-
hierarchical religions (e.g., Protestantism) on entrepreneurial activity at the national level (Fogel, Hawk, 
& Morck, 2006). However, our knowledge of such differences at the organizational level is minimal.  
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To explore the potential differences between Protestant and Catholic MFIs, we divide the sample and 
run separate regressions for each of the two groups5; see Table 6.   The results are interesting, and they 
differ from our expectations based on the historical debate. First, we observe that the effects of Christian 
identity on portfolio yield observed in previous analyses do not apply to Protestant MFIs. The lower 
portfolio yield reported in Table 4 is produced entirely by Catholic MFIs. We find that both Protestant 
and Catholic MFIs have lower funding costs than secular MFIs. However, unlike Catholic MFIs, Protestant 
MFIs do not translate lower funding costs into lower interest rates. Instead, Protestant providers incur 
higher operational costs. 6  
 Some may argue that lower efficiency levels in Protestant MFIs are the result of better and more 
personalized client attention and mentoring. We have tested for this hypothesis and actually find the 
opposite (unreported).  Both Catholic and Protestant MFIs serve more clients per staff member than 
secular MFIs. The inefficiencies found in Protestant MFIs must stem from other sources and should be 
researched further.  
The Catholic/Protestant split sample regressions for the social outcomes and bottom-line financial 
performance are reported in Table 7. We observe that the lower degree of focus on female clients is 
prevalent in both types of MFIs and that neither Catholic nor Protestant MFIs serve significantly poorer 
clients compared with secular MFIs. Likewise, neither of the two types of Christian MFIs show bottom-
line financial performance that is similar to that of secular MFIs. In unreported analyses, we find that 
although only 64.5% of Catholic MFIs break even, 75.6% of Protestant providers manage to remain 
financially afloat. Therefore, Protestant MFIs seem to care more about their long-term survival than 
Catholic MFIs. 




7. Conclusions, policy lessons and a research agenda 
7.1. Summary, conclusions and limitations 
This study answers recent calls for more research regarding the role of religion in development (Ter Haar 
& Ellis, 2006; Tyndale, 2001). In contrast with most other studies, we focus on providers rather than 
recipients of development efforts. We use data from the microfinance industry and present the first 
empirical comparisons of the performance of Christian and secular MFIs. Based on institutional theory, 
we expected Christian and secular MFIs to be different because they are subjected to different 
isomorphic factors. 
Indeed, our comparisons show that Christian MFIs perform differently from secular MFIs in several 
dimensions. We find that Christian MFIs have a lower cost of funding, reach relatively fewer female 
clients, and have lower bottom-line financial performance compared with secular MFIs. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, Christian MFIs are as effective in enforcing loan repayment as their secular peers. 
Furthermore, we find important differences within the group of Christian MFIs: the lower bottom-line 
performance for Catholic MFIs is the result of lower interest rates charged on loans whereas the weak 
financial performance of Protestant MFIs is the result of higher operational costs. Therefore, although 
Catholic MFIs pass on the subsidies that they receive to their clients, the advantage of accessing 
inexpensive funding is consumed internally in Protestant MFIs. These results support the relevance of 
analyzing and comparing sub-groups and denominations in future studies of religion and development. 
Several limitations of our comparison of secular and Christian MFIs should be noted. First, we use a 
broad range of financial performance measures but only two indicators of social performance: average 
loan size and percentage of female clients served. Though these are the mostly used social indicators in 
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microfinance research and management, we admit that they do not necessarily indicate an MFI’s social 
results. Therefore, if possible, future research should include additional indicators to study the social 
performance of MFIs. Moreover, we recommend researchers to look deeper into the female gender bias 
in microfinance. In a gender policy perspective, maybe the 63 per cent female borrowers reported in 
Christian MFIs are as good as or even better than the 73 per cent female borrowers reported in secular 
MFIs?  
Second, we have compared the performance of MFIs with secular and Christian origins; we have not 
examined the operational, market or management differences between the two types of MFIs or 
differences in visions and goals. Thus, our explanations for the performance differences between the two 
types of organizations are preliminary and should be tested empirically.  
7.2. Policy lessons 
Our findings present important insights for Christian development actors and their donors to consider. 
First, Christian development organizations have an advantage because they often have relatively easy 
access to international networks and donors. However, this advantage may lead to inefficiencies rather 
than provide better quality for the recipients of development services. Donors have a particular 
responsibility in ensuring that their funds reach the target groups. Second, Christian development actors 
should be concerned about their long-term financial sustainability. Nowadays, when the effect of market 
based approaches to development problems is being debated (Cooney, K., & Shanks, T. R. W., 2010) and 
when microfinance in particular is criticized (Bateman, 2010) being dependent on subsidies is a risky 
strategy for MFIs and their clients. Third, donors and policy makers should remember that statistics 
report averages. Many efficient Protestant MFIs, such as Diaconia FRIF in Bolivia, are assisting poor 
clients while ensuring their own sustainability. Forth, as indicated in the hypotheses section, there are 
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solid reasons for why Christian MFIs could be among the most efficient microfinance providers. We thus 
recommend managers and donors to ensure that Christian inspiration translates into benefits for clients. 
7.3. Toward a research agenda for religion and economic development 
In this study, we have compared the characteristics and performance of secular and Christian providers 
of microfinance. The results confirm that religious identity is relevant and support the calls for more 
research in this area. However, we have addressed only a limited range of issues and have addressed 
issues relating to only one party, the providers of financial services. In the following discussion, we 
develop a broad agenda for future research pertaining to religion and economic development. We divide 
the presentation into three research arenas: the providers, the recipients, and the interaction between 
them. We acknowledge that not all the topics mentioned are derived directly from the findings in this 
paper. However, because this type of research is still in its infancy, we think the following agenda might 
inform and stimulate future research efforts. 
Providers 
First, there is a need for more descriptive research regarding the differences between religious and 
secular provider organizations, including MFIs. Organizations with religious identities other than 
Christian should be examined. In addition, other characteristics in addition to those addressed in the 
current study could be relevant. For instance, we welcome comparisons of vision and mission 
statements, formal strategies, strategic objectives, client management practices, and recruitment 
policies in organizations with different religious or secular identities. The differences observed in our 
study could be related to these variables. In addition to descriptions of differences among organizations 
with different religious identities, we need in-depth case studies of provider organizations with religious 
identities to discover relationships between religious values and management practices. For example, 
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our findings show that Protestant MFIs have higher costs than Catholic MFIs. However, we are currently 
unable to explain this difference. In-depth studies of Protestant and Catholic MFIs could identify the 
management practices that may explain the higher cost figures and could examine whether and how 
such practices are related to religious values or principles. A third avenue for research pertaining to the 
role of religion among providers is corporate governance. One plausible prediction is that Christian 
organizations have fewer principal-agent problems compared with secular organizations because owners 
and managers follow the same stewardship logic and subscribe to the same principles of economic 
activity (see Jegers, 2009).  
Recipients 
Similar to the research needed in the provider arena, we need descriptive comparisons of recipients with 
different religious and secular backgrounds. However, other descriptive variables are relevant in the 
recipient arena. For instance, religious attitudes and values may influence the motivation, managerial 
practices, and social capital of the recipients of microloans. A recent study of owners of small micro-
financed ventures (MFVs) in Nairobi shows that religious attitudes significantly affect the levels of self-
efficacy, proactive business planning, and financial performance (Supphellen, Haugland, & Oklevik, 
2010). Notably, some religious attitudes had positive effects, and others had no effects or negative 
effects. To understand the nature and antecedents of these and similar results, we need in-depth case 
studies of the cultures and practices of recipients.  
One important way to support MFVs is business training and education. Because major determinants of 
learning, such as motivation and persistence, are influenced by religious attitudes and values, the effects 
of religion on business training should be addressed. Additionally, business ethics represent another 
important area that is influenced by religion and that necessitates further research. Corruption and other 
types of ethical misconduct are major threats to economic development (e.g., Gifford, 2009). Our 
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knowledge of the relationships among various religious values and (un)ethical economic conduct is 
minimal. Because religion in theory provides people with moral guidance and doctrines, researchers 
should study differences in ethical conduct across religious groups.  
Interaction between providers and recipients   
In addition to in-depth studies of the influence of religion in the recipient and provider arenas, we 
suggest the need for research pertaining to the relationship between the parties. The unit of analysis in 
this context is the relationship, such as a dyad between an MFI and a client or between an American 
NGO (provider) and an African partner organization (recipient). To the best of our knowledge, no 
empirical studies have addressed the influence of religious values and attitudes on the nature and 
effectiveness of cooperation and communication in such dyads. The religious factor is likely important in 
the interaction between providers and recipients. It is well-established in the communication and 
sociological literature that similarity breeds connection. Frequency and openness of interaction is 
stimulated by homophily, which refers to the degree to which pairs of individuals are similar with respect 
to certain attributes, such as beliefs, values, status, and education (Rogers & Bhowmik, 1970). Religious 
beliefs and values are the main dimensions of dyadic similarity judgments. In particular, research shows 
that religious homophily is an important determinant of the formation of close ties between individuals 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Given this background, we expect religious homophily to have 
a profound effect on the nature and quality of cooperation and communication between providers and 
recipients. Subjective homophily (similarity as perceived by the parties) is more predictive of 
interpersonal attraction and the frequency of interaction than objective homophily (Rogers & Bhowmik, 
1970). Perceived similarity can be influenced and managed. Because religious homophily is both 
important and possible to manage (by means of recruitment and communication), this factor deserves 
more attention from both researchers and managers of development organizations. An interesting 
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question for future research in this area is whether increased knowledge of another party’s religious 
beliefs and values may positively influence the perception of religious homophily. A related issue 
concerns the possible ways to design means of communication and cooperation that overcome the 
barriers of low (objective) religious homophily.  
Across the three arenas, we suggest that researchers explore beyond crude comparisons of religions. The 
scant research pertaining to religious factors in development informs us that important differences can 
be expected between branches or denominations within religions. Moreover, the identification of 
religious attitudes and values related to economic behavior, which are meaningful across religious 
groups and denominations, would be useful.  Additionally, the proposed agenda raises questions that are 
relevant to researchers in several disciplines concerned with economic behavior: sociology, 
anthropology, psychology, communication, management, ethics, and economics. We need a multi-
disciplinary approach to understand the implications of religion in economic development efforts. The 





1. In this article, the term Christian MFI is defined as an MFI that was originally initiated by a Christian 
organization. 
2. The structure of the panel is as follows: for 165 MFIs (40.74%), we have 4 years of data; for 96 MFIs 
(23.70%), we have 3 years of data; for 48 MFIs (11.85%), we have 5 years of data; for 36 MFIs (8.88%), 
we have 6 years of data; for 26 MFIs (6.41%), we have 2 years of data; for 18 MFIs (4.44%), we have 1 
year of data; for 13 MFIs (3.20%), we have 7 years of data; for 2 MFIs (0.48%), we have 8 years of data; 
for 1 MFI (0.24%), we have 9 years of data. 
3. When the rating report provides no clear information regarding a possible Christian background, the 
MFI is excluded from the analyses.   
4. OSS measures whether operational income covers operational, financial and default costs. FSS is OSS 
adjusted for subsidies and other MFI-specific income statement adjustments as assessed by the rating 
agency. 
5. Among the 65 Christian MFIs, 23 MFIs have Catholic origins, and 42 MFIs have Protestant origins. The 
many firm-years available in the rating reports allow for meaningful statistics with 89 firm-years for 
Catholic MFIs and 176 firm-years for Protestant MFIs. 
6. In unreported regressions, we check whether the poorer operational efficiency in Protestant MFIs is 
driven by international networks Opportunity International and Vision Fund because about half of the 
Protestant MFIs belong to these networks. Our findings indicate that such an explanation can be 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for variables included in the study 
 n Mean Median Stan. dev. Min Max 
TA (x 1000) 1585 6348 2672 13200 19 248000 
Age 1605 9.26 8.00 6.74 1 79 
TLP (x 1000) 1599 4276 1972 6072 3 59700 
Operational costs (x 1000) 1574 892 466 1652 1 37700 
Operational costs / TLP (%) 1505 0.34 0.23 0.42 0.01 1.00 
Portfolio yield (%) 1515 0.39 0.34 0.23 0.02 2.00 
% cost of borrowed funds 1393 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.96 
PaR30 (%) 1466 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.97 
Average loan 1492 728 386 1109 25.86 10000 
Female clients (%) 2805 0.73 0.74 0.24 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1518 0.01 0.025 0.126 -0.99 0.99 
OSS 892 1.14 1.11 0.38 0.07 2.96 
FSS 874 0.95 0.96 0.32 0.06 3.00 
Dummy Christian 1601 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Dummy regulated 1568 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Dummy nonprofit (NGO/COOP) 1606 0.64 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 









Table 2. Univariate statistics on the differences between Christian and secular MFIs 
 Mean values Median values 
 Christian Secular t-stat Christian Secular χ²-stat 
Financial performance drivers       
Portfolio yield 0.35 0.40 3.61*** 0.30 0.35 13.95*** 
Cost of funds 0.05 0.08 4.78*** 0.05 0.07 16.63*** 
Operational costs / TLP 0.31 0.31 0.40 0.23 0.24 1.50 
PaR30 0.07 0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.03 0.11 
Bottom-line financial performance      
ROA -0.01 0.01 1.89** 0.02 0.03 2.58** 
OSS 1.14 1.13 -0.23 1.12 1.11 0.03 
FSS 0.91 0.96 1.56* 0.93 0.98 3.47* 
Social performance       
Average loan 641 749 1.40 360 387 0.37 
% female clients 0.63 0.73 4.69*** 0.63 0.74 12.63*** 





Table 3. Social performance differences between Christian and secular MFIs (RE model) 
Social perf. Average loan size % female clients 
Christian MFIs -119.0 -0.067*** 
   
Firm-specific controls   
Lnta 76.01** -0.02*** 
Age 3.46 0.001 
Dumregulation 83.80 -0.06** 
Dumownership 156.98 -0.11*** 
   
Contextual controls   
Heritage -3.38 -0.001 
GDP per capita 15.93 0.00 
HDI -1417 0.29 
   
Regional dummies yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes 
Model stats   
N 1354 680 
Wald χ² 194.40*** 25.56*** 
R² 0.16 0.34 
* Note: Dumownership = 1 if an MFI is a bank or a non-bank financial institution and 0 if an MFI is an NGO or a 




Table 4. Financial performance differences between Christian and secular MFIs (RE model) 
Financial 
performance drivers 
 Yield Cost of funds Costs / 
TLP 
PaR30 
Christian MFIs -0.025** -0.026*** 0.016 -0.001 
     
Firm-specific controls     
Lnta -0.005 0.004 -0.059*** -0.001 
Age -0.003* 0.001 -0.001 0.002* 
Dumregulation -0.074** -0.006 -0.014 0.003 
Dumownership 0.059** -0.001 0.034 -0.004 
     
Contextual controls     
Heritage 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HDI 0.62*** 0.11* 0.42** -0.01 
     
Regional dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Model stats     
N 1387 1281 1377 1330 
Wald χ² 119.63*** 89.09*** 191.90*** 79.95*** 
R² 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.10 
* Note: Dumownership = 1 if an MFI is a bank or a non-bank financial institution and 0 if an MFI is an NGO or a 







Table 5. Bottom-line performance differences between Christian and secular MFIs (RE model) 
 
Bottom-line perf. ROA OSS FSS 
Christian MFIs -0.023*** -0.031* -0.059* 
    
Firm-specific controls    
Lnta 0.029*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 
Age -0.01 -0.007 -0.006 
Dumregulation -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
Dumownership 0.003 0.042 0.051 
    
Contextual controls    
Heritage -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HDI -0.083 -0.189 0.041 
    
Regional dummies yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes 
Model stats    
N 1383 825 799 
Wald χ² 97.16*** 135.05*** 174.46*** 
R² 0.17 0.12 0.17 
* Note: Dumownership = 1 if an MFI is a bank or a non-bank financial institution and 0 if an MFI is an NGO or a 







Table 6. Sub-samples of Protestant versus Catholic MFIs: financial performance drivers 
Financial performance 
drivers 
Portfolio yield Cost of funds PaR30 costs/TLP  
Catholic MFIs (yes/no) -0.071**  -0.033***  -0.01  -0.029   
Protestant MFIs (yes/no)  0.014  -0.015**  0.006  0.058*  
          
Firm-specific controls          
Lnta -0.004 -0.003 0.006* 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.058*** -0.057***  
Age -0.003* -0.003* 0.00 0.00 0.002* 0.003* -0.001 -0.001  
Dumregulation -0.071*** -0.069** -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.016 -0.014  
Dumownership 0.044* 0.043* -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.026* 0.024  
          
Contextual controls added added added added Added added added added  
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes  
Time dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes  
Model stats          
N 1317 1317 1220 1220 1261 1261 1312 1312  
Wald χ² 113*** 112*** 82*** 65*** 75*** 78*** 189*** 187***  
R² 0.21 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.23  
* Note: Dumownership = 1 if an MFI is a bank or a non-bank financial institution and 0 if an MFI is an NGO or a 






Table 7. Sub-samples of Protestant versus Catholic MFIs: social and bottom-line financial performance  
Bottom-line and social 
perf. 
% female clients Average loan FSS ROA 
Catholic MFIs (yes/no) -0.076*  -127.49  -0.017*  -0.080**  
Protestant MFIs (yes/no)  -0.036*  -126.67  -0.067**  -0.087** 
         
Firm-specific controls         
Lnta -0.033*** -0.032*** 76.28** 75.27** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 
Age 0.006* 0.006* 1.88 2.26 -0.006* -0.006* -0.004** -0.004** 
Dumregulation -0.039* -0.038* 82.96 81.01 0.038 0.037 -0.011 -0.013 
Dumownership -0.102*** -0.097*** 181.98 186.32 0.017 0.021 -0.017 -0.014 
         
Contextual controls added added added added added added added added 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Model stats         
N 620 620 1294 1294 770 770 1238 1238 
Wald χ² 22.93*** 23.60*** 174.42*** 180.21*** 154.64*** 163.29*** 105.16*** 102.41*** 
R² 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 
* Note: Dumownership = 1 if an MFI is a bank or a non-bank financial institution and 0 if an MFI is an NGO or a 
cooperative.   
 
